
RELEVANCE OF MANIPUR IN INA MOVEMENT: A STUDY ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL IMPACT

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ABSTRACT

The idea of political consciousness was very strong and the demand for the establishment of a responsible government in Manipur was very high with the experience of INA movement in Manipur. During this movement the British government was to stop the possible moral and physical support of the people of Manipur in favour of INA. This paper is attempted to insight the modus operandi and relevance of the Manipuris in the INA movement; to examine the impact of INA movement on the socio-economic and political conditions. This analysis is done through empirical and quantitative method. The study is based on primary and secondary sources. The finding shows that the majority of the sepoy in the corps was Indian. The captured Indian troops were expected to provide potential recruits for the expansion of the INA. The idea of anti-colonialism and anti-feudal feeling was very in the mind of the people of Manipur. The leaders and workers of the Nikhil Manipuri Mahasabha welcomed the appeal of Netaji.

Keywords: Relevance of manipur, INA movement, Socio-economic condition, Political consciousness

INTRODUCTION

The first attack of the Azad Hind Fauz was started on the 14 February 1944. The INA (Indian National Army) had at that time three divisions of thirty thousand men and twenty thousand women under training. The first division, which fought in Arakan and Imphal popularly known as Gandhi Regiment was commanded by Inayat Kiani. The Japanese were helping themselves because unless India was free from the hand of British, the area conquered by Japan in the East Asia could never be safe (Pandit, 1988: 242). Indian National Army did not alone that they always go together with Japanese Forces. It is said that at no time would any of its Units of less than a Battalion strength be detached for action; the INA under its own commanders, subject to overall strategic command of the Japanese, would fight as an allied army of equal status with the Japanese army; the INA would be subject to its own military laws and codes framed by the

provisional Government of free India the administration of liberated Indian territories would vest fully and absolutely with the provisional Government of Free India. The sole objective of the INA and of the Provisional Government of free India was to liberate India and once their enemies were thrown out of the country than they would be able to establish a new government of free country than they would be able to establish a new government of free India. It is also mentioned that Netaji knew very well that the result of the battle of Imphal was not very important to Japan. He also knew that Japan was sure to be defeated in the war. Perhaps he gave his observation after getting the experience of their fighting in the Pacific, so he strongly emphasized to sole responsibility of INA for the liberation of India. He believed that if he was able to control Imphal, definitely there would be stirred up on anti-British revolt in Eastern India and wide spread sabotage of the British military installations and mean of communication would be able to continue effectively. (Ibid, 267)

Relevance of Manipur in INA movement

The British forces were forced to retreat from Burma and consolidated their position in Imphal. The Japanese forces began to enter inside the territory of Manipur from three different directions. At this juncture, the British government carried on a series of psychological warfare to win over the mind of the people of Manipur by distributing leaflets from the plane. Their main concern was to stop the possible moral and physical support of the people of Manipur in favour of INA. At that time the political condition in Manipur was also in a very fluid situation. The idea of the growth of political consciousness was very strong and the demand for the establishment of a responsible government in Manipur was very high. In short the idea of anti-colonialism and anti-feudal feeling was very in the mind of the people of Manipur. The INA also distributed pamphlets to the people of Manipur and seek the support from them. It is said that some of these pamphlets were brought by two tribal people from Sugnu, a remote place in the southern side of the valley of Manipur. The message of Netaji appealed to the people of Manipur specially the leaders and workers of the Indian National Congress to extend unstinted support to the Indo-Japanese forces. The leaders and workers of the Nikhil Manipuri Mahasabha which had an identical ideas and objective with India national Congress welcomed the appeal of Netaji.

In March 1944, three army divisions of Japan along with the Subhas Brigade entered Indian Territory after crossing the Chindwin River (Dasgupta, 1997: 38). By 19th March, the powerful Japanese formation 31st Division was ferociously attacked the Indian Parachute Brigade and British battalion at Ukhrul. Desperate fighting ensured for two days at Shanshak, 8 miles south to Ukhrul; and on 30th March Shanshak also failed into the hands of INA and Japanese forces and eventually all the roads into Imphal were effectively blocked (Lal, n.d: 178). The strong forces of the Japanese and INA compelled the 17th British division retreated through Tiddim road and left

completely the southern portion of hill areas of Manipur on 10 April 1944. Thus withdrawal of British troops from Moirang to Potsangbam was completed on 13th April 1944 (Koireng, n.d). "Thirty-two Meiteis who earned their livelihood in Burma joined the movement under the leadership of L. Guno Singh of Khurai, Imphal, Manipur and they took part in the war. Thirteen out of 32 Meiteis reached Pallel as advanced party and tried to secure the recruits of the enemy and also to seek the support of the local people. 19 out of them marched towards the Tiddim road and reached Manipur valley and out of them 4 were arrested by the British army at Khuga Valley at Churachandpur, Manipur in the month of March, 1944" (Koireng, 1987: 588) A large number of Manipuri Tribals who were the members of the erstwhile British V force also joined the movement and took part in the war.

In the morning of 14 April 1944 the leaders of Indo-Japanese Advanced Group had a discussion with M. Koireng Singh and some local men at Tronglaobi village. On the same day Col. Saukat Ali Malik, Commander of the Bahadur (Intelligence) Group of INA planted the Tri-Colour flag with Springing Tiger embossed on it at the historic Moirang Kangla, Manipur. On the next day the leaders and workers of the Nikhil Manipuri Mahasabha welcomed the appeal made by Netaji. 13 members of the Mahasabha from Imphal joined with the members of Moirang and worked together with the people of Moirang and collected large quantity of ration and carried out espionage activities. They all join the INA All the surrounding villages up to Nighthoukhong on the north were liberated from the British yoke. All the southern parts of Manipur from Ningthoukhong onwards were liberated from the British rule and the Provisional Government of Free India controlled the area for three months till 15 July 1944. The INA and Japanese forces were able to get proper and regular food and all other essential things from the people of Manipur. To see this condition, the political agent of Manipur ordered to kill some leader like M. Koireng Singh, L. Sanaba Singh, K. Gopal Singh and H. Nilamani. The 13 members of the Nikhil Manipuri Mahasabha were blacklisted by the government. A number of Manipuris joined the INA and contributed to the last fight for freedom from the British yoke. During the INA and Japanese forces stay in different parts of Manipur, the local people supported them in many ways (MPCC, 1985).

Finally the INA and Japanese forces retreated. Many factors were responsible for that. The heavy downpour of the monsoon in this region destroyed all major activities. There were shortages of supply from the Japanese Government. The shortage of ration created a lot of havoc to Japanese and INA forces. There were no air cover from the Japanese side and at the same time the Japanese were losing its ground in the Pacific War. Some Manipuris also went back along with them. A batch of six Manipuri left Moirang for Rangoon with Col. Malik. It was unfortunate that the Germany's defeat in the war in April and her surrender on 3 May 1945 as well as the dropping of atom bombs in Hiroshima (6th August, 1945) and Nagasaki (9th August, 1945),

compelled Japan to surrender to the Allied forces in the middle of 14 August 1945, the INA at Rangoon also surrendered. The members from Manipur were also arrested by the Rangoon occupying Allied Forces from their hiding places through a tip for Manipuris and put in Rangoon Central Jail.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Many literatures are available on the issue of INA but the concern on this topic is very limited, some of them may be reviewed hereunder. Priyadarshni (2012) argued that when the Japanese conquered the Malay Peninsula; a large number of Indian soldiers kept in as prisoners into their hands. Under an agreement with the Japanese Government, Bose organized them into an Azad Hind Fauz or Indian National Army. He inaugurated the Government of Free India at Singapore. This Provincial Government was immediately recognized by nine powers. At midnight on October 23, the Government declared war on Britain to effect liberation from their dominion. The Indian National Army had been formed by Rash Behari Ghosh and Captain Mohon Singh and others, was reorganized and revitalized (Priyadarshni, 2012: 3).

Mohendra (2017) observed that Manipur, the last place on Earth with its secluded capital Imphal, wedged between Burma and India, and under British suzerainty only for 56 years, was unknown to the world until WWII. During Japanlan, Manipur gloriously stood the test of time against the Nippon Army that ploughed as a whirlwind from far-away Japan. History destined Manipur to be guarded by the Allies rather than by Manipuris. The great turning point of WWII in Asia began in Manipur on 10 May 1942 when the Japanese first dropped their bombs over Imphal and were routed in late 1945, when all the remnants of the Allies Army left Imphal.

Ranjit (2011) stated that Japan dropped the first bomb on Imphal on the 10 May 1942 and again on the 16 May 1942 heralding the beginning of World War II in Manipur. Further, it is revealed that at Nambol, a section of 4 Assam Rifles was stationed to wait and watch the Japanese aircraft. They were to heliograph a message to Headquarters 4 Assam Rifles at Kangla on seeing any aircraft, where upon the siren warning would be sounded. Since April 1942, the Japanese reconnaissance plane began to fly near the Manipur sky almost every day. The bombs fell at Residency, 4th Assam Rifles area, Khwairamband Bazar, Keishampat and Wahengbam Leikai area. The front of the residency was damaged by a near miss and a bomb landed on the main gate of the jail and demolished it. The main bazaar had been gutted after the second raid and Khwairamband bazaar remained closed.

Pandit (1988) mentioned in his analysis that "...Netaji told them that they should never think that the Japanese were doing a great favour to India. The Japanese were helping themselves because unless India was free from the hand of British, the area conquered by Japan in the East Asia

could never be safe. Besides, one India was free; the Japanese could make considerable gain through trade with India. These were Japanese main interest in her cooperation with the Azad Hind Fauj." Kirby (n.d) analysed and confirmed that if Imphal had fallen to the Japanese one of the consequences could have been a revolt in Bangal and Bihar against the British rule in India might well have been on a far large scale then the riots of 1942. In the month of March, 1944, three Japanese Army divisions along with Subhash Brigade entered the Indian Territory after crossing big rivers, different hill ranges and thick forests and attempted to thrust deep inside the territories of India. Kiani (1985) regarding the difficulties of Japanese troops in the war at Manipur stated that troops of the second (Gandhi) Guerilla Regiment, after marching for over a hundred miles, had to be rushed into action in jungle and hilly country which was unknown to them and was extremely difficult to operate in. In addition to the physical difficulties of terrain, lack of supplies coupled with long marches, the INA had several other handicaps. It is difficult to admit but the fact was that the Japanese Commander up to that time was not quite sure as to how the INA would behave once it reached the frontline. It definitely showed a lack of trust and confidence on their part in that they deployed it at places where not much damage would be done if the INA, either for military or political reason got out of hand started infiltrating into India and fighting independently.

OBJECTIVE

Main objectives of the study are:

- To insight the modus operandi and relevance of the Manipuris in the INA movement;
- To examine the impact of INA movement on the socio-economic and political conditions;
- To understand the major causal and impact leading to the failure of INA movement in Manipur

HYPOTHESIS

The British government carried on a series of psychological warfare to win over the mind of the people of Manipur. Their main concern was to stop the possible moral and physical support of the people of Manipur in favour of INA. The INA also made efforts to seek the support from them. The idea of the growth of political consciousness was very strong and the demand for the establishment of a responsible government in Manipur was very high. In short, the idea of anti-colonialism and anti-feudal feeling started with the experience of INA movement.

METHOD

This analysis is emphasised on empirical and quantitative method. No single method can be solely relied upon for making a meaningful enquiry to a topic like the present one. Therefore, a

combination of traditional and modern methods is being applied in the study. Historical and descriptive methods have been followed to explore the modus operandi of Manipuri involvement in the INA movement. The study is based on primary as well as secondary sources.

Manipur and Japan during WW II

As mention in the above paragraph, Japan dropped bomb on Imphal twice in the month of May 1942 heralding the beginning of World War II in Manipur. At Imphal within a few hours of bombing, almost every house in Imphal was abandoned by 1,10,947 residents generally leaving a male member of the family for guarding their properties and fled for safety to outlying villages (Ranjit, 2011: 3). Meitei primitive innocence had a knock on the head when the Japanese Army that tasted victory in Southeast Asia met its Waterloo in Manipur. Japanlan arrived in Manipur on 10 May 1942 with the promise of destruction it was going to wreak. It ended on 15 August 1945 as suddenly as it started, after the Japanese surrendered to the Allies on 6 August 1945 (Mohendra, 2017). It was a simple matter of Americans dropping two small atom bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The INA forces cross the Indian frontier on 19 March 1944 from the Kennedy Peak. The fought extremely well in spite of serious handicap and lack of armaments and air support, Pallel and Tamu fell. The Tiddim front led by Col. Shaukat Ali Malik with the Hikari Kikan group was following the route to Churachandpur in Manipur. They captured Moirang and put it under the control of the Provisional Government of Azad Hind.

By the end of June 1944 both the Japanese and British forces fought a severe battle with very heavy casualty on both sides. The British concerned was to break the ring round Kohima and achieve a link up with beleaguered Imphal. The Japanese efforts on the other hand were directed to capture Imphal and its supply dumps before being driven off from Kohima and road blocks that had been put up between that place and Imphal. The INA and Japanese troops based in Moirang were fighting very hard in and around Bishenpur with the British forces. The British could bring more troops as reinforcement by rail and road up to Kohima from Assam and keep them regularly supply; their IV Corps fighting in the Imphal plain was being reinforced and maintained through virtually uninterrupted air operations. The 5th and 7th Divisions which made a decisive difference to the fighting around Imphal had been air lifted from the Arakan – a development which the Japanese had originally not taken into account. Because of uneven contest, the INA and Japanese forces fighting in Beshenpur and around Imphal but could not capture Imphal.

By that time, a very heavy downpour started in the northeastern India and Chin hills. M.Z. Kiani wrote:- “The supply problem in fact had become so grave that why the third week of June, the INA were hoping that Imphal would not fall but that we all withdraw in time to the line of the Chindwin River, where supplies could be brought up. The fair was that available supplies in

Imphal would not meet the requirements of all the Japanese and INA forces as well as the trapped IV British corps and that innumerable soldier would starve to death. With the fall of Imphal further British supplies would naturally have ceased while the Japanese would not have been able to bring in any while the monsoon lasted, and there were still at least three months of the rainy season to go” (Kiani, 1985: 39). The Japanese attack on Imphal without a doubt came within ace of success. But there were many important factors operating against them in the beginning of 1944 when they started large scale operations, first in Arakans and then in the state of Manipur. Finally they were withdrawn from the state and retreated fully.

In the month of March, 1944, three Japanese Army divisions along with Subhash Brigade entered the Indian Territory after crossing big rivers, different hill ranges and thick forests and attempted to thrust deep inside the territories of India. The 31st Japanese division along with a regiment of INA reached Kohima Town and fought a fierce battle and ultimately captured the town with the exception of important places like tennis court. Dimapur road the only life line of Manipur was blocked for about a month. The 15th Japanese division with one INA regiment marched towards Tamu and Ukhrul in two ways. Ukhrul was captured. In the mean time another group of the division reached Pallel. The 33rd Japanese division with the one INA regiment marched towards Tiddim road. The Indo-Japanese force advanced very fast. Col. Shaukat Malik setup headquarter in the liberated town of Moirang and hoisted the tri-colour flag at Moirang Kangla on 14th April, 1944. (Kirby, n.d., 273)

INA and their efforts in the periphery of Manipur

On 29 April, Mohammad Kiani proposed that the combined force of Japanese and the INA should attack simultaneously on the Pallel airfield from two sides – the Yamamoto men from the west and the INA group from the south. But the attack was failed with a great set back. This was a turning point in the tide of the war. Japanese thought that Imphal would be fallen in the middle of April 1944. Then it would give a new opportunity to consolidate their position. They were of the view that if they capture Imphal it would be great gain to them because there was every possibility to capture a large number of prisoners from the IV British Corps which was fighting in Imphal plains. The majority of the Sepoy in the corps was Indian. The captured Indian troops were expected to provide potential recruits for the expansion of the INA. But Imphal did not fall as expected, and Japanese Division fighting for it was not only stalemated but was finding their supply position becoming precarious as the days passed. Hopefully for them the fall of Imphal was expected to provide large stocks of weapons and supplies which the British had accumulated at their based for operation against Burma. So to render help for the improvement of the battle situation, the rest of the INA Division was hurriedly brought forward and deployed on the Tamu-Pallel sector of the front. At this time the situation was no doubt critical for the Japanese, but the

INA had to face unexpected difficulties for lack of adequate arrangement in conducting itself in a manner that was expected of it as a fighting formation.

The 3rd (Nehru) Regiment had to march for over 200 miles to reach its forward base. In addition to the physical difficulties of terrain, lack of supplies coupled with long marches, the INA had several other handicaps. It is difficult to admit but the fact was that the Japanese Commander up to that time was not quite sure as to how the INA would behave once it reached the frontline. It definitely showed a lack of trust and confidence on their part in that they deployed it at places where not much damage would be done if the INA, either for military or political reason got out of hand started infiltrating into India and fighting independently (Kiani, 1985: 31).

On 5th May as if an order the monsoon started in the Chin Hills surrounding areas restricting large scale operations. They also converted the Kabaw Valley, the main channel of communication to the rear, gradually into a veritable sea of mud, and the dry streams into raging torrents, making it impossible for any wheeled traffic move, and causing a complete stoppage of supplies from the beginning of June. Meanwhile, the third Regiment, under Lt. Col. Gulzara Singh, having marched from Yeu, the rail head, to Kalewa, moved up the Kabaw Valley of Mintha, a distance of about 250 miles and reached their in the third week of May. The Regimental Headquarters was established of Narum, some 15 miles north west of Mintha. They were protecting the fight flank of Yamamoto force, carrying out the harassing raids on the British lines of communications in the direction of Wangjing on the Pallel-Imphal road and generally to fill the gap between the Yamamoto force and the 15th Japanese division on the right. (Ibid: 38)

By that time the first Regiment under Shahnawaz was still in the Haka-Falam area skirmishing with the Chin Levies of the British Lushai Brigade operating from Aizol in the west and both the regimental commanders and Kiani were keen that these forces should rejoin the first division in Pallel front as quickly as possible. This was restricted by the Japanese as they wanted to use the regiment for relieving pressure on their troops in the area of Kohima and Ukhrul to where they had started moving it. But only Shahnawaz and some of his staff could go past Ukhrul, but had to return in considerable haste, as the siege of Kohima had ended and Japanese retreat in this sector had begun (Ibid: 39).

Socio-economic and political Impact

Every movement has got its own impact in every aspect of their society. May be positive or negative but it rendered a lot of contribution in the ongoing developmental process in the life of the people of the society. In the case of Manipur also the INA and World War II has produced a tremendous impact in the future life of the people of this country. Manipur was the one of the main battlefield of the World War II and it affected almost all the normal life of the State. The

worst part was its economy position during the wartime. During this period, due to insecure position in the life of the people almost all the activities of agriculture was completely stopped and people had to survive on rations. This system was continued till the first half of 1945. The price of the rice increased tremendously. It is recorded that the price of rice reaches either to Rs. 50/- or 60/- per mound, which was indeed, beyond the capabilities of the war torn people of Manipur. Even during the time of the World War II the army people destroyed all the food grains, which were stored by the people. Apart from this the security people devastated the life stock in many villages. No chicken and pigs could be found. To see this condition the local authority of the Manipur requested to the Government of India for relief measures. Accordingly, about 24 depots in the hills and plains were open and along with it ration were supplied to many villages and about one and half lakhs people were fed. Such type of relief measures was not sufficient enough to meet the required demand of the people.

The Government of India also decided to give relief measures to villagers whose household articles were either stolen or loss during the war. Relief measures were also taken up for the construction of damaged houses. As many as 5,503 houses in 409 villages were destroyed. The worst affected areas were Moirang (550 houses), Bishenpur (26 houses), East area (2,100 houses in 160 villages), Valley area (1,463 houses in 59 villages), Sadar area (1,636 houses in 163 villages), Mao area (137 houses in 8 village) and West area (209 houses in 19 villages).

In spite of all these economic problems the people in general was able to get a very experience about the misdeeds committed by the imperialist forces. Though the INA could not fulfill its military mission, its political mission was more than achieved. As mentioned earlier the growth of the idea of political consciousness was started very late. But the INA movement gets a new impetus to the growing political consciousness among the people of Manipur. The sense of patriotism among the people of this place was a great achievement of the movement of India National Army. Even the common people, after having this experience could understand the political trend in Manipur as well as in India. Then it also helped in the strengthening of the relationship between the leaders of Manipur with the other national leaders of India. On the other hand it also helped to growth of a sense of oneness among the people and idea of nationalism was gradually emerged among the people of Manipur. The establishment of Manipur State Congress Party in the year 1946 was an immediate impact of the movement of the Indian National Army. The plank of the party was to establish a responsible Government on the basis of democratic principles. So the establishment of this party was undoubtedly laid basic foundation for having a close relationship between the All India Congress and the Manipur State Congress. Like the All India Congress Committee, the Congress Party of Manipur also challenged the colonial and feudal administration of the state; even they began to change the tone of the slogan.

Apart from its significance in the state it also produced unity in the national struggle. When the brave warriors of the patriotic army were brought to India for trial before the British court, the whole of India was protested as one voice. The INA movement gave a very good impact in the ideology of the peoples of the Manipur particularly among the middle class section. It gave an opportunity to expose to the national and international trends and gave the opportunity to fight for new socio-economic and political changes in the state. The politics of the different parties like the Manipur State Congress, Krishak Sabha, Praja Sangha, Kuki National Assembly, NCC and the Mizo Union in the hills may be examined for the background of the movement of Indian National Army. The hill people also awakened and they began to cry of democracy and independence. Sometimes, the idea of self-determination was also reflected in their mind. Gradually a large section of educated people particularly from the hill areas came out and they began to take important role in the hill politics. Gandhi wrote this remarkable achievement with following words "Although the INA failed to achieve its immediate objectives, they have a lot to their credit of which they might well be proud. Greatest among these was together under one banner men of all religion and races of India and to infuse into them the spirit of solidarity and oneness, to the utter exclusion of all communal parochial sentiments. It is an example which we should all emulate".

MAJOR FINDINGS

- Netaji knew very well that the result of the battle of Imphal was not very important to Japan.
- They were of the view that if they capture Imphal it would be great gain to them because there was every possibility to capture a large number of prisoners from the IV British Corps.
- The majority of the sepoy in the corps was Indian. The captured Indian troops were expected to provide potential recruits for the expansion of the INA.
- The Japanese forces began to enter inside the territory of Manipur from three different directions.
- The idea of anti-colonialism and anti-feudal feeling was very in the mind of the people of Manipur.
- A number of Manipuris joined the INA and contributed to the last fight for freedom from the British yoke.
- During the INA movement, Japanese forces stay in different parts of Manipur, the local people supported them in many ways.
- Due to insecure position in the life of the people almost all the activities of agriculture was completely stopped and people had to survive on rations.

- The INA movement gets a new impetus to the growing political consciousness among the people of Manipur.
- The sense of patriotism among the people of Manipur was a great achievement of the movement of India National Army.
- INA movement also helped to growth of a sense of oneness among the people and idea of nationalism was gradually emerged among the people of Manipur.
- The INA movement gave a very good impact in the ideology of the peoples of the Manipur particularly among the middle class section.
- Netaji appealed to the people of Manipur specially the leaders and workers of the Indian National Congress to extend unstinted support to the Indo-Japanese forces.
- The leaders and workers of the Nikhil Manipuri Mahasabha which had an identical ideas and objective with India national Congress welcomed the appeal of Netaji.
- The idea of the growth of political consciousness was very strong and the demand for the establishment of a responsible government in Manipur was very high.

CONCLUSION

It will be relevant to know that Manipuris who took part in the INA at Rangoon were in Guest Houses at Kandogulay, Rangoon. The other members were attached to the Intelligence group of the INA. However, Subhas did not lose hope, his aspirations to achieve independence was living. On the 25 April 1945, a few days before the Japanese evacuated Rangoon, he flew out of the capital leaving behind a message in which the Government and people of Burma for their help and hospitality. Whatever said and done, we assure that his foundation of the Indian National Army, its organisation in the foreign land, its programme for complete independence – all speak of his highest degree of capability during the World War II. The great mission was executed in a grand manner and successes of the INA brought about a great damage to British interests in South-East Asia. (Priyadarshni, 2012). Perhaps Netaji gave his observation after getting the experience of their fighting in the Pacific, so he strongly emphasized to sole responsibility of INA for the liberation of India. He believed that if he was able to control Imphal, definitely there would be stirred up on anti-British revolt in Eastern India and wide spread sabotage of the British military installations and mean of communication would be able to continue effectively. Knowing the historical fact of facts, Rajaram emphatically asserted and reaffirmed on the subject matter that great historian R.C. Majumdar wrote, Subhas Bose with his INA campaigns probably contributed more to Indian independence than Gandhi, Nehru and their movements. Moreover, the result of Subhas Bose's activities was the rise of the nationalist spirit in the Indian Armed Forces. As a matter of facts the Quit India Movement launched in 1942 were not the last uprising against the British rule in India, it was rather a part of the ongoing politics in India.

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