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Title: The Thinking Self in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations
Authors: Dr. Sushobhona Pal
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Dr. Sushobhona Pal Assistant Professor, Calcutta
MLA 8 Pal, Dr. Sushobhona. "The Thinking Self in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations." Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research, vol. 4, no. 12, Dec. 2019, pp. 7570-7582, ijsser.org/more2019.php?id=578. Accessed Dec. 2019. APA 6 Pal, D. (2019, December). The Thinking Self in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research, 4(12), 7570-7582. Retrieved from ijsser.org/more2019.php?id=578 Chicago Pal, Dr. Sushobhona. "The Thinking Self in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations." Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research 4, no. 12 (December 2019), 7570-7582. Accessed December, 2019. ijsser.org/more2019.php?id=578.
References [1] . Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1953. Philosophical Investigations. Ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees. Tr. by G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford. Basil Blackwell. (Henceforth used as PI) No. 293 [2] . Ibid No. 308 [3] . Vohra, Ashok. 1986. Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mind. Croom Helm Ltd. London. p.69. [4] . PI No. 410 [5] . Vohra, Ashok. 1986. Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mind. Croom Helm Ltd. London. p.81. [6] . PI No. 416 [7] . Ibid No. 244 [8] . Ibid No. 246 [9] . Ibid No. 283 [10] . Ibid No. 180 [11] . Ibid No. 253 [12] . Peursen, C.A. van. 1969. Ludwig Wittgenstein. An Introduction to his Philosophy. Faber and Faber. London. p.88. [13] . Grayling, A.C. 1988. Wittgenstein. Oxford University Press. Oxford. p.88. [14] . Schroeder, Severin. 2001. Private Language and Private Experience in Wittgenstein: A Critical Reader. Ed. H.J. Glock. Blackwell. Oxford. p.178. [15] . Ibid pp.179-80. [16] . Backhurst, David. 2001. Wittgenstein and ‘I’ in Wittgenstein: A Critical Reader. Ed. H.J. Glock. Blackwell. Oxford. p.227 [17] . Glock, H.J. 1996. A Wittgenstein Dictionary. Blackwell. Oxford. p.163. [18] . Backhurst, David. 2001. Wittgenstein and ‘I’ in Wittgenstein: A Critical Reader. Ed. H.J. Glock. Blackwell. Oxford. p.233. [19] . Glock, H.J. 1996. A Wittgenstein Dictionary. Blackwell. Oxford. pp.163-164. [20] . Backhurst, David. 2001. Wittgenstein and ‘I’ in Wittgenstein: A Critical Reader. Ed. H.J. Glock. Blackwell. Oxford. p.234. [21] . Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1975. Philosophical Remarks. Ed. R. Rhees. Translated by R. Hargreaves and R. White. Blackwell. Oxford. pp.89-90. [22] . Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1959. Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930-33 in G. E. Moore, Philosophical Papers. Allen and Unwin. London. p. 307. [23] . Glock, H.J. 1996. A Wittgenstein Dictionary. Blackwell. Oxford. p.12. [24] . PI No. 281. [25] . Hark, Michel ter. 2001. The Inner and the Outer in Wittgenstein: A Critical Reader. Ed. H.J. Glock. Blackwell. Oxford. p.213. [26] . Arrington. R.L. 2001. Thought and its Expression in Wittgenstein and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Ed. Severin Schroeder. Palgrave. New York. p.148.
Abstract: Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations presents an outright denial of the Cartesian thinking soul substance. He shows that the inner – outer dichotomy is due to a misapprehension of our language. For the later Wittgenstein nothing is hidden. In this context this paper shows how Wittgenstein does away with the personal pronoun ‘I.’ He shows that the word ‘I’ has a totally unique grammar which is irreducible to any other. The unique use of the personal pronoun ‘I’ is discussed entirely from the perspective of language and grammar in the Investigations. The ‘I’ does not signify an ego or owner of experiences in ‘I am in pain’, any more than the word ‘pain’ denotes a private sensation. It is a pseudo-statement that cannot be judged to be true or false and contextual reference in such cases is to be noted. Wittgenstein characterizes the uses of first-person present tense psychological sentences like “I am in pain” as avowals (Äuberung), meaning expressions, manifestations, being substitutes for natural expressions like cries, smiles, grimaces. According to Wittgenstein I simply have the sensations—I do not observe or perceive them as my own and any talk of an ‘inner realm’ can only be in a metaphorical sense. In this context this paper discusses the concept of the thinking self as presented in Philosophical Investigations.

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